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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In three separate, unrelated cases (Nos. 37767, 38051, and 38078), Amber 
Stewart was charged with, and convicted of, a number of offenses . All three cases 
have been consolidated for purposes of appeal. In this consolidated appeal, however, 
Ms. Stewart asserts an issue arising from only one of her cases, No. 37767; she waives 
all appellate issues stemming from the other two cases (Nos. 38051 and 38078). 
In No. 37767, Ms. Stewart was charged with possession of methamphetamine 
with the intent to deliver, a felony, and driving without privileges and possession of 
marijuana, both misdemeanors. She filed a suppression motion, asserting that the 
search of her vehicle (which yielded the methamphetamine and marijuana that she was 
ultimately charged with possessing) was an unconstitutional warrantless search; 
however, that motion was denied based on the theory that the search in question was a 
proper "inventory" search attendant to the impoundment of her vehicle. Thereafter, 
Ms. Stewart entered into a conditional plea agreement, whereby she specifically 
preserved her right to appeal the district court's denial of her suppression motion. 
On appeal, Ms. Stewart asserts that the district court erred in denying her 
suppression motion. Specifically, she contends that the "inventory" search of her 
vehicle violated her Fourth Amendment rights because it was not conducted in 
conformance with police department policy. 
In response, the State offers a number of arguments . First, the State claims that 
an inventory search need not be conducted in conformance with any standardized 
police impoundmenl/inventory policy, so long as it is objectively reasonable under the 
circumstances . (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7, 8-9.) Second, relying on a non-existent 
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finding by the district court, the State argues that the impoundmenl/inventory search of 
Ms. Stewart's car was objectively reasonable. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-8.) Third, and 
apparently as an alternative to its first two arguments, the State asserts that the police 
in this case did act consistently with departmental policy. (Respondent's Brief. pp .9-12 .) 
The present Reply Brief is necessary to clarify both the law and the facts, and to 
explain why the State's arguments are without merit. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously set forth in 
Ms. Stewart's Appellant's Brief and, thus, should not need to be repeated herein. 
However, because the State has presented a misleading picture of the facts of this 
case, two points of clarification are required herein. 
In i1s Respondent's Brief, the State claims that Officer Leon Dennis, the Garden 
City Police Department ("GCPD") officer who pulled Ms. Stewart over, arrested her, and 
impounded and searched her vehicle, made the decision to impound her automobile 
because otherwise that car would have been left unsecured. (Respondent's Brief, p.7 
("Because her car would be left unattended and unsecured in the middle of the night in 
what tile officer testified was a high crime area, Officer Dennis decided to impound it.") .) 
Further, in a similar vein, the State claims that the district court found, as a factual 
matter, that Ms. Stewart's vehicle would have been left "unsecured" if it had not been 
towed by the police, and that the impoundment, therefore, was undertaken in 
compliance with GCPD policy. (See Respondent's Brief, p.4 ("Specifically, it [the district 
courtJ found that Officer Dennis's decision to impound Stewart's car after arresting her 
was reasonable and complied with GCPD's policies because Stewart was uninsured 
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and her car would be left unsecured."), p.10 ("In this case, the district court found that 
Officer Dennis impounded Stewart's vehicle, not as a 'backdoor approach in a narcotics 
investigation,' but in accordance with GCPD criteria, because the uninsured's car would 
be left unsecured. . . . Stewart has not established clear error in the district court's 
factual findings."), p.11 ("As discussed above, Stewart was taken into custody for driving 
without privileges, and the district court found that her vehicle would be left unsecured.") 
(citations omitted), p.12 ("The district court correctly found that his decision to impound 
the vehicle complied with GCPD's general guidelines. The district court also correctly 
found that Officer Dennis's inventory complied with GCPO's standard procedures .... "): 
see also Respondent's Brief, p.11 ("The district court implicitly found that Stewart's car 
would be left unsecured.").) Both of these claims by the State are, at best, misleading. 
First, although Officer Dennis testified that he "l:c]ertainly" has "concerns" about 
"leav[ing] a vehicle unattended" because there is a "potential for theft or things like that" 
and, in this case. Ms. Stewart's car would have been left in what was supposedly a 
"high-crime area," he never said that he impounded her car because it would have been 
left unsecured. (See Tr., p. 74, Ls.1-8.) As was explained in Ms. Stewart's Appellant's 
Brief (p.3), Officer Dennis testified only that it is his objective to tow as many of his 
arrestees' vehicles as possible because "[i]t's just simpler that way." (Tr., p.72, Ls.16 -
20, p. 79, L.6 - p.80, L.15.) Further, as was also pointed out in Ms. Stewart's 
Appellant's Brief (pp.3-4), a concern that Ms. Stewart's vehicle would be left unsecured 
was only one of three arguable considerations taken into account by Officer Dennis in 
impounding the vehicle (the other two being that the vehicle itself was not insured and 
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that the vehicle may have been impeding business at the gas station where it was 
parked). (See Tr., p.72, L.16- p.74, L.8, p.79, Ls.6-9.) 
Second, contrary to the State's claim, the district court made no finding that 
Ms. Stewart's vehicle would have been "unsecured" had it not been impounded, or that 
the impoundment or search in this case complied with GCPD policy. (See generally 
R., pp.30-37 (district court's entire order denying suppression motion).) Rather, the 
district court's factual findings on this matter were as follows: 
The Defendant testified that her friend was insured and able to drive the 
Defendant's car, despite the car being uninsured. However, the offices 
did not allow the friends to assist in taking the vehicle. On this issue, 
Officer Dennis testified that he chose to tow the vehicle because it was 
permitted under the policy, where there was an arrest made. In addition, 
Officer Dennis testified that he made the decision based on the lack of 
insurance [on the vehicle itself], and the location of the vehicle. Officer 
Dennis testified that he usually requests a tow when the policy allows, that 
it is easier than dealing with the alternatives, and that in 80% of his arrests 
involving a vehicle, the vehicle is towed. 
(R., p.33.) Later, in upholding the impoundment and search, the district court based its 
decision on what it perceived to be the reasonableness of GCPD's impoundment policy, 
as well as a conclusory statement as to what it perceived to be the general 
reasonableness of the officers' actions in this case. The district court stated as follows: 
Garden City Police Department Procedure 4.608.2(2)(C) authorizes an 
officer to impound a vehicle when the driver has been taken into custody 
and the vehicle is left unsecured. Garden City Police Department 
Procedure 4.608.3(1)(c) requires officer[s] to perform an inventory search, 
including glove compartments, unlocked container, and the trunk. 
Officer Dennis testified that he made the decision to tow the vehicle 
pursuant to these policies and procedures. In addition, Officer Dennis 
testified that it is his usual practice to tow a vehicle after an arrest, 
because it is easier for him. In this instance the officers were under no 
obligation to trust any alleged representations of the Defendant's friends, 
that they had valid insurance to take \awful possession of the vehicle. The 
Court finds this policy and procedure reasonable and legitimate. There is 
no indication that these policies were employed as a back-door approach 
4 
in a narcotics investigation. Indeed, they had existed since 1987 and were 
last revised in December of 2003, well before Gant1 was decided in 2009. 
It cannot be seriously argued they were put in place to circumvent the 
decision in that case. Further, Officer Dennis testified that, had his 
concerns been interdiction of illicit substances, he would have requested a 
drug dog. 
The Court finds the impoundment and search objectively 
reasonable under all the circumstances known to the police when the 
decision to impound was made. Accordingly, the inventory search is valid 
and the evidence obtained therefrom will not be suppressed. 
(R., pp.36-37.) If anything, it appears from this passage that the district court upheld the 
search in this case based on either the officers' desire not to be inconvenienced or their 
distrust of Ms. Stewart's friends, not any concern that the vehicle would have been left 
unsecured. (See R., pp.36-37.) 
1 Arizona v. Gant,_ U.S._, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err in refusing to suppress evidence discovered through a 
warrant\ess search of Ms. Stewart's vehicle? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Refusing To Suppress Evidence Discovered Through A 
Warrantless Search Of Ms. Stewart's Vehicle 
In her Appellant's Brief, citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), 
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987), and Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990), 
Ms. Stewart argued that inventory searches are only permissible insofar as they are 
conducted pursuant to reasonable, standardized police department procedures for the 
impoundment and inventorying of vehicles. (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-12.) She then 
asserted that the search in her case was constitutionally impermissible because, 
although GCPD has policies governing the impoundment and inventorying of vehicles, 
the impoundment of her vehicle did not comply with those policies. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.12-15.) In particular, she argued that the State failed to show that the impoundment 
was generally authorized under GCPD's policies and, even if the impoundment was 
generally authorized, that Officer Dennis complied with policy by first obtaining Watch 
Commander approval of the impoundment in this case. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-15.) 
Finally, Ms. Stewart asserted that because the search of her vehicle violated the Fourth 
Amendment, the district court erred in failing to suppress the drugs found in that search 
and the inculpatory statements made immediately afterward. (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-
16.) 
In response, the State offers a number of arguments. First, the State claims that 
an inventory search need not be conducted in conformance with any standardized 
police impoundment/inventory policy, so long as it is objectively reasonable under the 
circumstances. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7, 8-9.) Second, relying on a non-existent 
finding by district court, the State argues that the impoundment/inventory search of 
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Ms. Stewart's car was objectively reasonable. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-8.) Third, and 
apparent!y as an alternative to its first two arguments, the State asserts that the police 
in this case did act consistently with departmental policy. (Respondent's Brief. pp.9-12.) 
For the reasons set forth in detail below, none of these arguments have merit. 
The State's first argument is remarkable in that it both distorts Ms. Stewart's 
argument on appeal and misstates the law. The State claims that, in arguing that 
inventory searches are only valid insofar as the impoundment and inventory of the 
vehicle in question are undertaken in compliance with police department policy, 
Ms. Stewart is arguing that compliance with policy "supersedes the Fourth 
Amendment['s] objective reasonableness" requirement. (Respondent's Brief, p.9 
(emphasis added); accord Respondent's Brief, p.8 ("Stewart has misinterpreted the 
caselaw to arrive at this erroneous legal standard which would have the effect of 
elevating strict compliance with local department policies above the objective, universal 
test of Fourth Amendment reasonableness to searches and seizures.").) This claim is 
made as part of the State's contention that, when evaluating the propriety of a purported 
inventory search, the only relevant inquiry is the exceptionally broad question of 
whether the impoundment and inventorying of the vehicle was objectively reasonable 
under the circumstances. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.6-10, 12.) 
!nitially, it should be pointed out that Ms. Stewart never argued that strict 
compliance with department policies concerning the impoundment and inventorying of 
vehicles "supersedes" the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. (See 
generally Appellant's Brief.) To the contrary, it should be quite apparent from 
Ms. Stewart's discussion of general Fourth Amendment standards, as well as 
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Opperman, supra, and its progeny, that the reasonableness or any given search is 
always the key inquiry In resolving a suppression issue, but that When ihe State seeks 
to justify a warrantless search under Jhe Inventory exceptJon to the warrant requrremenl 
that search v11II only be found to be reasonable and, thus, oonsbtutionat. ii the State can 
show that the impoundmont and subsequent search were conducted rn acoordance with 
a reasonable. standardized police department policy (See Appellant's Brief. pp 10-12) 
Furthermore, it Is simply incorrect for the Stale to suggest that When it oomes to 
Inventory searches, compliance with a standardized department policy is essenllally 
Irrelevant so tong as the impoundment and inventory search tS otherwise deemed 
reasonable under the circumstances In Opperman, supra, the United States Supreme 
Court specll1catty held that "inventories pursuant to standatd police procedure are 
reasonable" and, thus, permissible under the Fourth Amendment Opperman, 428 US 
al 372 (emphasis added) In part, this holding was based on the Court's prior decrslon 
In Cady v. Dombrowski, 41 3 U.S 433, 436 (1 973), wherein "(tlhe Court (hadl carefully 
noted that the protective search (of an tmpOUnded vehicle) was carried out in 
accordance with standard procedures in lhe IOCat pollce department, a factor rending 10 
ensure that the intrusion would be limded In scope ro the extent necessary ro carry our 
the caretaking function." Opperman. 428 U.S ar 374-75 (emphasis ,n original),) Years 
later, in Bertine, supra, the Court again focused on compliance wilh srandardlzed 
procedures, noting as follows: "We emphasize that, in this case, the tnal court found 
!hat the Police Departmeru's procedures mandated the opening of closed containers 
and the listing of their contents. Our decisions have always adhered to tho requirement 
that Inventories be conducted 8CCCrding lo standardized criteria • Bertine, 479 U.S at 
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374 n.6 (emphasis added). It then went on to hold that officers did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment just because they exercised discretion in impounding and 
inventorying the defendant's vehicle; the Court held that such discretion is permissible 
"so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria .... "2 Id. at 375-
76 (emphasis added). Finally, in Wells, supra, the Supreme Court found that an 
inventory search of a locked suitcase in the trunk of a vehicle was unreasonable and, 
thus, unconstitutional because there was no department policy to address closed 
containers in inventoried vehicles. Wells, 495 U.S. at 4-5. The Court reasoned that 
"absent such a policy, the ... search was not sufficiently regulated to satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment .... " Id. at 5. In light of these authorities, it is absurd for the State to now 
suggest that compliance with standardized procedures in impounding and inventorying 
vehicles is essentially irrelevant, and that the only relevant question is whether the 
officer(s) generally acted reasonably under the circumstances. 
The State's second argument, i.e., that the impoundmenUinventory search of 
Ms. Stewart's car was objectively reasonable in light of the ''finding" that the car would 
have otherwise been left "unsecured," is no more compelling than its first argument. As 
noted in the above Statement of Facts, the fundamental proposition upon which this 
argument is based, i.e., the district court's "finding" that the car would have been 
"unsecured" had it not been impounded is unsupportable. As noted, the district court 
made no such finding. Nor could the district court have made such a finding. As was 
2 Notably, in Bertine, Justice Blackmun, speaking not only for himself, but also for 
Justices Powell and O'Connor, "wr[o]te separately to underscore the importance of 
having such inventories conducted only pursuant to standardized police procedures." 
Id. at 376-77 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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discussed in Ms. Stewart's Appellant's Brief (p.14), when Ms. Stewart was arrested, the 
police obtained the keys to her vehicle, so it was easily locked, i.e., "secured."3 (See 
Ex. 1, Track B, at 06:09.) Moreover, even if the district court had believed Officer 
Dennis's claim that the vicinity of 37th St. and Chinden Blvd. is a "high-crime area" 
generally (see Tr., p.74, Ls.4-8) and had made such a factual finding (which it did not 
(see R., pp.30-37)), this fact alone would not support a conclusion that Ms. Stewart's 
locked vehicle would have been "unsecured," especially since it was parked on the front 
side of a business that was open 24 hours (Tr., p.73, Ls.1-11) and, therefore, was likely 
located in a lighted area in full view of the public. Thus, it ought to be apparent that the 
State failed to meet its burden of showing that the impoundment/inventory of 
Ms. Stewart's vehicle was consistent with department policy, i.e., reasonable. 
The State's third (and alternative) argument, i.e., that the police in this case acted 
consistently with departmental policy, is also without merit. The State's initial assertion 
is that Officer Dennis did not take the view that he has '"absolute, unfettered discretion 
to impound and inventory the vehicle of everyone he arrests"' and impound 
Ms. Stewart's vehicle on that basis but, rather, that he permissibly exercised discretion 
3 The State's argument that locking a vehicle does not secure that vehicle because it 
could still be subject to "property damage and theft, such as windows being smashed, 
locks being jimmied, the ignition being hotwired, or the body being keyed" 
(Respondent's Brief, p.10) is unavailing because it would require an absurd 
interpretation of the GCPD policies. Under the State's reasoning, only an impounded 
vehicle could be considered "secured" and, thus, not subject to impoundment. Stated 
another way, the GCPD would allow for impoundment of any unimpounded vehicle at 
any time; however, if this were the case, the whole of subsection (2) of Policy 4.608.2 
(which carefully identifies the circumstances under which officers may cause vehicles to 
be impounded) would be rendered mere surplusage. Furthermore, if the policy were to 
be given such an interpretation, it would be too broad to "sufficiently regulate[ ]" police 
conduct, Wefts, 495 U.S. at 5, and, thus, any impoundment/inventory conducted 
thereunder would run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. 
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"according to standard criteria" "because the uninsured's car would be left unsecured." 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10 (quoting Appellant's Brief, p.13).) The State's claims are 
disproved, however, by the record. Officer Dennis testified that his understanding of 
GCPD was that "[w]henever we place someone under arrest, the vehicle can be towed." 
(Tr., p.61, Ls.22-25; accord Tr., p.80, L.20 - p.82, L.13 (testifying that GCPD's policies 
provide no criteria for towing a vehicle when its driver has been arrested).) Further, as 
discussed above, Officer Dennis never testified, and the district court never found, that 
Ms. Stewart's vehicle was impounded and searched in this case based on Officer 
Dennis' concern that it would otherwise be "unsecured." 
The State further contends, in wholly conclusory fashion, that Officer Dennis 
complied with the requirement that he obtain Watch Commander approval of any 
impoundments because he had "standing approval" from his Watch Commander to 
have any vehicle impounded that he chose. (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12.) However, 
the State offers no argument as to how "standing approval" by one Watch Commander 
for one particular patrol officer to exercise his discretion whoever he wishes satisfies the 
requirement of GCPD's policies that, in every case, a Watch Commander sign off on 
every impoundment (see Ex 82 §§ 4.608.2.2 & 4.608.3.1 ). or the United State's 
Supreme Court's requirement that impoundments/inventories be conducted consistent 
with policy so that the procedure for doing so is standardized across cases. See Wells, 
495 U.S. at 4-5; Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374 n.6. As was discussed in Ms. Stewart's 
Appellant's Brief (p.p.14-15), when one Watch Commander relinquishes his supervisory 
authority vis-a-vis one of his patrol officers, he creates a situation which invites 
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disparate treatment of suspects and, thus, non-standardized procedures governing the 
impoundment/inventorying of the vehicles of GCPD arrestees. 
In light of the foregoing, Ms. Stewart continues to assert that the impoundment 
and search of her vehicle was not authorized under GCPD policy and, therefore, was 
not reasonable and permissible under the Fourth Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Stewart 
requests that this Court vacate her convictions and sentences in Case No. 37767, 
reverse the district court's order denying her suppression motion in that case, and 
remand that case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 20th day of September, 2011. 
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